What is most striking about the article is that their observations about cognition and the emotions are perceived as revelatory to those in their field, especially given that so many children with autism seem to have affect disorders (or better still, autism itself can be explained in terms of disorders of the affect).
A causal theory of concept acquisition, (I'm guessing that's why John mentioned Hume), could easily account for the idiosyncrasies and different contextual factors (such as emotion) mentioned in the article without jeopardizing the major tenets of the theory. In fact, Hume does admit of individual differences in sensation and in outlining his theory of taste.
Warren - I must be a little out of practice when it comes to Theory of Mind. Could you explain a little bit about your comment regarding Hume?
From my perspective, this article was enlightening for me when I first read it, because it posed a model of learning different from strict behavior reinforcement, perhaps evenhiglighting that strict reinforcement models of behavior education undermine healthy cognotove growth. If we do not appropriately tap into the emotions, then our children may not have as much growth in thier more "academic" modes of intelligence! This model of childhood learning is more fluid than typical behavior rienforce,emt models.
By the way - welcome aboard Bill! I think we should all feel comfortable gettign caught up with each other on the blogsite. I would love to hear how you and your lovely wife Tina are doing!
I didn't mean anything too complicated; just that we acquire concepts through experience and interaction with the world and that is one way of understanding Hume's impressions/ideas distinction. I can go into it a little more if you guys want.
The article reminded me of some of our discussions about phenomenology and some notions about "embeddedness" and "being situated." Who was the prof at MU that did work on affective intentionality?
You are thinking of Andy Tallon, who did a lot of work on and about Bernanrd Lonergan, Karl Rahner, and other Christian Phenomenologists.
I find thier approach Humean not simply because they link cognition to experience. Rather, they would link, fir example, the ability to understand numerical concepts to first having the experience of more or less desire. Numerical concepts (the idea that three is bigger than two) first comes with understanding the concept of more, which is ifrst understood in terms of desire.
To wit, one of Sam's teachers told me that he was struggling with numerical concepts last year. I suggested that she buy a box of Dunkin Donuts Munckin's and do some more or less concepts with the munchkins. Wouldn't you know that he had a perfect grasp of numerical concepts when the option of three donuts is greater than two was set before him.
I am not sure how and if that relates to Phenomenology, given my lack of expertise in that area of study.
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What is most striking about the article is that their observations about cognition and the emotions are perceived as revelatory to those in their field, especially given that so many children with autism seem to have affect disorders (or better still, autism itself can be explained in terms of disorders of the affect).
A causal theory of concept acquisition, (I'm guessing that's why John mentioned Hume), could easily account for the idiosyncrasies and different contextual factors (such as emotion) mentioned in the article without jeopardizing the major tenets of the theory. In fact, Hume does admit of individual differences in sensation and in outlining his theory of taste.
Warren - I must be a little out of practice when it comes to Theory of Mind. Could you explain a little bit about your comment regarding Hume?
From my perspective, this article was enlightening for me when I first read it, because it posed a model of learning different from strict behavior reinforcement, perhaps evenhiglighting that strict reinforcement models of behavior education undermine healthy cognotove growth. If we do not appropriately tap into the emotions, then our children may not have as much growth in thier more "academic" modes of intelligence! This model of childhood learning is more fluid than typical behavior rienforce,emt models.
By the way - welcome aboard Bill! I think we should all feel comfortable gettign caught up with each other on the blogsite. I would love to hear how you and your lovely wife Tina are doing!
I didn't mean anything too complicated; just that we acquire concepts through experience and interaction with the world and that is one way of understanding Hume's impressions/ideas distinction. I can go into it a little more if you guys want.
The article reminded me of some of our discussions about phenomenology and some notions about "embeddedness" and "being situated." Who was the prof at MU that did work on affective intentionality?
You are thinking of Andy Tallon, who did a lot of work on and about Bernanrd Lonergan, Karl Rahner, and other Christian Phenomenologists.
I find thier approach Humean not simply because they link cognition to experience. Rather, they would link, fir example, the ability to understand numerical concepts to first having the experience of more or less desire. Numerical concepts (the idea that three is bigger than two) first comes with understanding the concept of more, which is ifrst understood in terms of desire.
To wit, one of Sam's teachers told me that he was struggling with numerical concepts last year. I suggested that she buy a box of Dunkin Donuts Munckin's and do some more or less concepts with the munchkins. Wouldn't you know that he had a perfect grasp of numerical concepts when the option of three donuts is greater than two was set before him.
I am not sure how and if that relates to Phenomenology, given my lack of expertise in that area of study.
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